Duncan Pritchard: Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing by Ju Wang
277SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA69	(1/2020)	p.p.	(263–279)
Book	Eeviews	/	Buchbesprechungen
that	 Francis	 Bacon’s	 purported	 dislike	 of	
the	 mathematical	 method	 is	 only	 a	 shallow	
reading	 of	 this	 philosopher,	 and	 Lesley	 B.	
Cormack	insists	that	practical,	applied	math-





goes  against  the  usual  grain  of  interpreting  
Leibniz	 as	 a	 philosopher	 who	 subordinated	






that	 can	 be	 found	 among	 the	 pages	 of	 this	
book,	 and	 those	 that	 we	 omitted	 from	 this	
review	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 any	 less	
relevant	than	those	mentioned.	They	engage	
with	 other	 interesting	 issues,	 ranging	 from	
mathematical	 methodology	 to	 mathemati-
cal	 realism,	offering	valuable	philosophical	
analysis	 and	 ample	 historiographical	 infor-
mation.	However	varied	the	immediate	top-
ics	 of	 these	 essays	 are,	 and	 irrespective	 of	
how	 sympathetic	 their	 authors	 are	 towards	
the	mathematization	 thesis,	 an	 overarching	
sentiment	 still	 emerges,	 a	 conclusion	 that	
answers	 the	 challenge	 that	was	 initially	 ar-
ticulated	by	 the	editors.	Much	like	 the	case	
of	the	idea	of	a	monolithic	scientific	method,	









says	 is	perhaps	not	 as	bold	or	daring	as	 its	
title	would	at	first	 suggest,	it	is	nevertheless	
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We	ordinarily	 take	 ourselves	 to	 know	many	




epistemology.	 Epistemologists	 have	 devel-
oped	 various	 proposals	 to	 tackle	 this	 threat.	
Duncan	 Pritchard,	 a	 leading	 epistemologist,	
makes	his	unique	contribution.	His	proposal	
is	significant	in	three	aspects.	
First,	 radical	 scepticism	 has	 two	 influential	
arguments,	i.e.,	the	closureRK-based	and	the	
underdeterminationRK-based	 sceptical	 argu-
ments.	 They	 are	 logically	 independent	 but	
equally	 devastating,	 and	 thereby	 a	 satisfac-
tory	 treatment	 of	 scepticism	 should	 be	 able	
to	counter	 them	at	 the	same	 time.	However,	
many	 anti-sceptical	 proposals	 fail	 to	 do	 so.	
Pritchard’s	project	is	unique	in	this	respect.
Second,	 the	 sceptical	 challenge	 can	 be	 eas-
ily	 evaded	 if	 one	 adopts	 externalist	 theories	
of	 knowledge.	 However,	 externalism	would	
concede	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 rationally	
grounded	knowledge	and	that	what	we	have	
is	merely	animal	knowledge.	 In	 a	word,	 the	
externalist	strategy	makes	a	big	concession	to	
the	 sceptic.	While	 internalists	aspire	 to	 save	
rationally	 grounded	 knowledge,	 it	 is	 easier	
said	than	done.	Pritchard’s	book	provides	an	








we	 need	 to	 diagnose	 the	 sceptical	 problem.	
A	 diagnostic	 anti-sceptical	 proposal	 may	
include	 the	 following	 inquiry.	 What	 is	 the	
source	of	scepticism?	Is	 the	source	 innocent	
or	problematic?	Where	do	we	go	wrong	when	
we	 take	 the	 sceptical	 paradox	 as	 plausible?	
Pritchard’s	diagnostic	story	helps	us	to	resist	
the	sceptical	lure.




of	 sceptical	 arguments,	 i.e.,	 the	 closureRK-	
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based  and  the  underdeterminationRK-based  
sceptical	arguments	for	scepticism	as	follows:




(CR2)	 If	 S	 has	 rationally	 grounded	
knowledge	 that	 p	 (e.g.,	 I	 am	 reading	 a	
paper),	and	S	competently	deduces	 from	
p	 that	 q,	 thereby	 forming	 a	 belief	 that	
q	 on	 this	 basis	while	retaining	her	ratio-
nally	grounded	knowledge	that	p,	then	S	
has	 rationally	 grounded	knowledge	 that	
q.	[The	closureRK	principle]




(UP1)	 If	S’s	 rational	 support	 for	believ-





(UP2)	S’s	 rational	 support	 for	 believing	
that	 p	 does	 not	 favour	 p	 over	 q	 and	 S	
knows	 that	p	is	incompatible	with	q.
(UP3)	 Thus	 S	 does	 not	 have	 rationally	
grounded	knowledge	that	p.	(P.	34.)
He	 explicitly	 formulates	 the	 sceptical	 chal-
lenge	 in	 an	epistemic	 internalist	 line	 so	 that	
he	 can	 establish	 the	 conclusion	 that	 ratio-
nally	grounded	knowledge	 (what	RK	stands	
for),	rather	 than	brute	externalist	knowledge,	
is	 nonetheless	 possible.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	
anti-sceptical	 strategies,	 Pritchard	 argues	
for	 undercutting	approach	over	 overring	ap-
proach.	The	former	approach	takes	the	scepti-
cal	 challenge	 as	 a	 spurious	 paradox	 which	











universality of rational evaluation thesis  (p.  
55).	This	thesis	says	that	there	is	no	in	prin-
ciple	 limitation	 on	 rational	 evaluation,	 such	
that	 global	rational	evaluations	are	perfectly	
legitimate.	However,	in	light	of	the	Wittgen-
steinian	 account	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 rational	
evaluation,	 Pritchard	 argues	 that	 rational	
evaluations	are	essentially	 local	 in	 the	sense	
that	one	must	first	presuppose	hinge	proposi-






particular,	 closureRK	 principle	 is	 innocent,	
but	 the	sceptic	is	misapplying	 this	principle.	
This	dubious	application	consists	of	a	rational	
evaluation	 from	 an	 everyday	 proposition	 to	
an	 anti-sceptical	 proposition.	After	 all,	 anti-
sceptical	 propositions	 are	 not	 under	 rational	
evaluations	from	the	Wittgensteinian	perspec-
tive,	and	therefore	they	are	not	in	the	market	




In	 the	 third	 part,	 Pritchard	 deals	 with	 the	
underdeterminationRK-based	 sceptical	argu-
ment.	What	underlies	this	form	of	scepticism	
is the insularity of reasons thesis	 (p.	 55).	
This	thesis	says	 that	our	rational	support	 for	





his	 brand	 of	 epistemological	 disjunctivism	
which	 is	extensively	defended	 in	Pritchard’s	
Epistemological Disjunctivism	 (Oxford	
University	 Press,	Oxford	 2012).	Here	 is	 the	
core	 claim	 of	 epistemological	 disjunctivism	
(henceforth	ED	for	short):
“In	 paradigm	 cases	 of	 perceptual	 knowledge,	 the	
knowledge	 in	 question	 enjoys	 a	 rational	 support	
that	is	both	factive	and	reflectively	 accessible	(…)	
the	 rational	 support	 one	 has	 for	 one’s	 knowledge	
that	p	is	that	one	sees	that	p.”	(P.	124.)
According	to	ED,	in	the	good	case,	one’s	ra-
tional support is one sees that p. This rational 
support	 favours	 one’s	 everyday	 belief	 that	




S,	 S	 has	 discriminating	 support	 for	 her	





has favouring support for her belief that p 
if	p	is	more	likely	to	be	true	than	q	does	
given	 S’s	 rational	 support,	where	 p	 and	
q	 are	incompatible	propositions	that	S	is	
aware	of.
Crucially,	 although	 one’s	 rational	 support	 in	
the	 good	 case	 (i.e.,	 one	 sees	 that	 p)	 does	
not	 provide	 one	 discriminating	 support	




p. After all, seeing that p entails that p. Thus, 
underdeterminationRK-based	 sceptical	 argu-
ment	 is	 wrong	 in	 assuming	 that	 one	 cannot	
have	 factive	 reason	 in	 good	cases	and	one’s	
rational	 support	 does	 not	 favour	 everyday	
proposition.	 Nonetheless,	 Pritchard	 notes	
that	ED	cannot	offer	a	modest	answer	to	the	
closureRK-based	scepticism.
In	 the	 fourth	 part,	 Pritchard	 combines	 his	
two	 diagnoses	 into	 a	 unified	 anti-sceptical	
proposal	 in	 an	 undercutting	 fashion.	 While	
the	 local	 nature	 of	 rational	 support	 cannot	
deal	with	 the	 challenge	 posed	 by	 underde-
terminationRK-based	 sceptical	 argument	
and	 the	 factivity	 of	 rational	support	cannot	




can	 be	 both	 local	 and	 factive.	 The	 biscopic	




This	 book	 is	 clearly	written	 and	well	 struc-
tured.	 It	 contains	 illuminating	 ideas	 and	 co-
gent	 arguments.	What	 is	particularly	helpful	
is	that	Pritchard	compares	his	novel	proposal	
with	 other	 existing	 anti-sceptical	 proposals,	
such	 as	 attributer	 contextualism,	 abductiv-
ism,	 epistemic	 externalism,	 contrastivism,	
dogmatism,	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 via	 those	 com-
parisons	that	his	own	proposal	gains	dialecti-
cal	advantages.	While	the	book	covers	much	
ground	 in	 radical	 scepticism,	 some	 points	
can	be	challenged.	Recall	his	discussions	of	




these	 theses,	 respectively.	 One	 might	 think	
that	what	he	merely	shows	is	 the	weak	con-




however,	 the	 strong	conclusion	 that	 the	 two	
theses	are	wrong.	For	sure,	when	two	things	
are	 incompatible,	we	need	more	 reasons	 for	
thinking	one	 thing	 true	 and	hence	reject	 the	
other.	In	this	aspect,	he	could	either	seek	help	
from	 pre-theoretic	 intuitions.	 For	 example,	
he	can	argue	 that	both	ED	and	 the	Wittgen-
steinian	 account	 are	 more	 in	 line	 with	 our	
intuitions.	This	strategy	may	help	undermine	
the	 plausibility	 of	 the	 two	 theses.	 However,	
this	move	 may	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 dialectically	






Transcendental	 Arguments”,	 International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies	 25	 (2017)	
2,	 pp.	 210–226,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.1080
/09672559.2017.1296881).	 Transcendental	
arguments, via a prior reasoning, start from a 
premise	that	radical	sceptics	accept	and	arrive	
at	a	necessary	 condition	for	the	possibility	of	
the	 premise.	Hence,	 if	we	 are	 to	 undermine	
the prima facie plausibility	of	the	sceptical	ar-
guments,	we	can	identify	some	premises	that	
both	 sceptics	 and	 non-sceptics	 will	 accept.	




the	 arguments	 given	 the	 special	 characteris-
tic	of	transcendental	arguments;	on	the	other	
hand,	 conclusions	 of	 such	 arguments	 can	
help	 illustrate	why	we	 have	 to	 endorse	 cer-
tain	views,	 such	as	 the	 local	 nature	 and	 the	
factivity	 of	 rational	 support.	 This	 strategy	
can	 provide	 further	 strength	 for	 Pritchard’s	
proposal	so	that	his	strong	conclusion	can	be	
secured.
Epistemic Angst  is  a  superb  book,  espe-
cially	 for	 those	 who	 are	 interested	 in	 radi-
cal	scepticism.
Ju Wang
